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Abstract
As machine learning is increasingly used to inform consequential decision-making
(e.g., pre-trial bail and loan approval), it becomes important to explain how the
system arrived at its decision, and also suggest actions to achieve a favorable
decision. Counterfactual explanations –“how the world would have (had) to be
different for a desirable outcome to occur”– aim to satisfy these criteria. Existing
works have primarily focused on designing algorithms to obtain counterfactual
explanations for a wide range of settings. However, it has largely been overlooked
that ultimately, one of the main objectives is to allow people to act rather than just
understand. In layman’s terms, counterfactual explanations inform an individual
where they need to get to, but not how to get there. In this work, we rely on
causal reasoning to caution against the use of counterfactual explanations as a
recommendable set of actions for recourse. Instead, we propose a shift of paradigm
from recourse via nearest counterfactual explanations to recourse through minimal
interventions, shifting the focus from explanations to interventions.
1 Introduction
Predictive models are being increasingly used to support consequential decision-making in a number
of contexts, e.g., denying a loan, rejecting a job applicant, or prescribing life-altering medication. As
a result, there is mounting social and legal pressure [47] to provide explanations that help the affected
individuals to understand “why a prediction was output”, as well as “how to act” to obtain a desired
outcome. Answering these questions, for the different stakeholders involved, is one of the main goals
of explainable machine learning [7, 14, 18, 24, 29, 37, 38].
In this context, several works have proposed to explain a model’s predictions of an affected individual
using counterfactual explanations, which are defined as statements of “how the world would have
(had) to be different for a desirable outcome to occur” [48]. Of specific importance are nearest
counterfactual explanations, presented as the most similar instances to the feature vector describing
the individual, that result in the desired prediction from the model [16, 23]. A closely related term is
algorithmic recourse – the actions required for, or “the systematic process of reversing unfavorable
decisions by algorithms and bureaucracies across a range of counterfactual scenarios” – which is
argued as the underwriting factor for temporally extended agency and trust [46].
Counterfactual explanations have shown promise for practitioners and regulators to validate a model
on metrics such as fairness and robustness [16, 41, 45]. However, in their raw form, such explanations
do not seem to fulfill one of the primary objectives of “explanations as a means to help a data-subject
act rather than merely understand” [48].
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Figure 1: Illustration of an example causal data generative process governing the world, showing both
the graphical model, G, and the structural causal model,M, [31]. In this example, X1 represents an
individual’s annual salary, X2 is bank balance, and Yˆ is the output of a fixed deterministic predictor
hθ, predicting the eligibility of an individual to receive a loan.
The translation of counterfactual explanations to recourse actions, i.e., to a recommendable set of
actions to help an individual to achieve a favourable outcome, was first explored in [45], where
additional feasibility constraints were imposed to support the concept of actionable features (e.g.,
prevent asking the individual to reduce their age or change their race). While a step in the right
direction, this work and others that followed [16, 28, 35, 41] implicitly assume that the set of actions
resulting in the desired output would directly follow from the counterfactual explanation. This
arises from the assumption that “what would have had to be in the past” (retrodiction) not only
translates to “what should be in the future” (prediction) but also to “what should be done in the
future” (recommendation) [43]. We challenge this assumption and attribute the shortcoming of
existing approaches to their lack of consideration for real-world properties, specifically the causal
relationships governing the world in which actions will be performed. For ease of exposition, we
present the following examples (See [3] for additional examples).
Example 1: Consider, for example, the setting in Figure 1 where an individual has been denied
a loan and seeks an explanation and recommendation on how to proceed. This individual has an
annual salary (X1) of $75, 000 and an account balance (X2) of $25, 000 and the predictor grants a
loan based on the binary output of hθ = sgn(X1 + 5 · X2 − $225, 000). Existing approaches may
identify nearest counterfactual explanations as another individual with an annual salary of $100, 000
(+%33) or a bank balance of $30, 000 (+%20), therefore encouraging the individual to reapply when
either of these conditions are met. On the other hand, bearing in mind that actions take place in a
world where home-seekers save %30 of their salary (i.e., X2 := 3/10 ·X1 + U2), a salary increase of
only %14 to $85, 000 would automatically result in $3, 000 additional savings, with a net positive
effect on the loan-granting algorithm’s decision.
Example 2: Consider now another setting of Figure 1 where an agricultural team wishes to increase
the yield of their rice paddy. While many factors influence yield = hθ(temperature, solar radiation,
water supply, seed quality, ...), the primary actionable capacity of the team is their choice of paddy
location. Importantly, the altitude at which the paddy sits has an effect on other variables. For
example, the laws of physics may imply that a 100m increase in elevation results in a 1◦C decrease in
temperature on average. Therefore, it is conceivable that a counterfactual explanation suggesting an
increase in elevation for optimal yield, without consideration for downstream effects of the elevation
increase on other variables, may actually result in the prediction not changing.
The two examples above illustrate the pitfalls of generating recourse actions directly from counterfac-
tual explanations without consideration for the structure of the world in which the actions will be
performed. Actions derived directly from counterfactual explanations may ask too much effort from
the individual (Example 1) or may not even result in the desired output (Example 2).
In this paper, we remedy this situation via a fundamental reformulation of the recourse problem,
where we rely on causal reasoning to incorporate knowledge of causal dependencies into the process
of recommending recourse actions, that if acted upon would result in a counterfactual instance
that favourably changes the output of the predictive model. In more detail, we first provide a
causal analysis to illuminate the intrinsic limitations of the setting in which actions directly follow
counterfactual explanations. Importantly, we show that even when equipped with knowledge of
causal dependencies after-the-fact, the actions derived from pre-computed (nearest) counterfactual
explanations may prove sub-optimal, or directly, unfeasible. Second, to address the above limitations,
we emphasize that, from a causal perspective, actions correspond to interventions which not only
model the change in the intervened-upon variable, but also the downstream effects of this intervention
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on the rest of the (non-intervened-upon) variables. This insight allows us to propose a recourse
through minimal interventions problem, whose solution informs stakeholders on how to act in addition
to understand. We complement this result with a commentary on the form of interventions, and
with a more general definition of feasibility beyond actionability. Finally, we provide a detailed
discussion on both the importance and the practical limitations of incorporating causal reasoning in
the formulation of the algorithmic recourse problem.
2 Algorithmic Recourse via Counterfactual Explanations
Counterfactual explanations (CFE) are statements of “how the world would have (had) to be different
for a desirable outcome to occur” [48]. In the context of explainable machine learning, the literature
has focused on finding nearest counterfactual explanations (i.e., instances),1 which result in the
desired prediction while incurring the smallest change to the individual’s feature vector, as measured
by a context-dependent dissimilarity metric, dist : X ×X → R+. This problem has been formulated
as the following optimization problem [48]:
xCFE∗ ∈ argmin
x
dist(x,xF) s.t. hθ(x) 6= hθ(xF),x ∈ P, (1)
where xF ∈ X is the factual instance; xCFE∗ ∈ X is a (perhaps not unique) nearest counterfactual
instance; hθ is the fixed binary predictor; and P is an optional set of plausibility constraints, e.g., the
counterfactual instance be from a relatively high-density region of the input space [15, 35].
Most of the existing approaches in the counterfactual explanations literature have focused on providing
solutions to the optimization problem in (1), by exploring semantically meaningful distance/dis-
similarity functions dist(·, ·) between individuals (e.g., `0, `1, `∞, percentile-shift), accommodating
different predictive models hθ (e.g., random forest, multilayer perceptron), and realistic plausibility
constraints, P . In particular, [6, 28, 48] solve (1) using gradient-based optimization; [39, 45] employ
mixed-integer linear program solvers to support mixed numeric/binary data; [35] use graph-based
shortest path algorithms; [23] use a heuristic search procedure by growing spheres around the factual
instance; [13, 41] build on genetic algorithms for model-agnostic behavior; and [16] solve (1) using
satisfiability solvers with closeness guarantees.
Although nearest counterfactual explanations provide an understanding of the most similar set of
features that result in the desired prediction, they stop short of giving explicit recommendations on
how to act to realize this set of features. The lack of specification of the actions required to realize
xCFE∗ from xF leads to uncertainty and limited agency for the individual seeking recourse. In order
to shift the focus from explaining a decision to providing recommendable actions to achieve recourse,
Ustun et al. [45] reformulated (1) as:
δ∗ ∈ argmin
δ
cost(δ;xF) s.t. hθ(x
CFE) 6= hθ(xF),xCFE = xF + δ,xCFE ∈ P, δ ∈ F ,
(2)
where cost(·;xF) : X × X → R+ is a user-specified cost that encodes preferences between feasible
actions from xF, and F and P are optional sets of feasibility and plausibility constraints,2 restricting
the actions and the resulting counterfactual explanation, respectively. The feasibility constraints
in (2), as introduced in [45], aim at restricting the set of features that the individual may act upon.
For instance, recommendations should not ask individuals to change their gender or reduce their age.
Henceforth, we refer to the optimization problem in (2) as the CFE-based recourse problem.
3 A Causal Perspective of Algorithmic recourse
The seemingly innocent reformulation of the counterfactual explanation problem in (1) as a recourse
problem in (2) is founded on two assumptions:
Assumption 1: the feature-wise difference between factual and nearest counterfactual instances,
δ∗ = xCFE∗ − xF, directly translates to the minimal action set, ACFE, i.e., performing the actions in
ACFE starting from xF will result in xCFE∗; and
1A counterfactual instance can be from the dataset [35, 49], or generated as in [16, 45, 48] among others.
2Here, “feasible” means possible to do, whereas “plausible” means possibly true, believable or realistic.
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Assumption 2: there is a 1-1 mapping between dist(·, ·) and cost(·; ·), whereby larger actions incur
larger distance and higher cost.
Unfortunately, these assumptions only hold in restrictive settings, rendering the solution of (2) sub-
optimal or infeasible in many real-world scenarios. Specifically, Assumption 1 holds only if the
individual applies effort in a world where changing a variable does not affect other variables (i.e., no
variable causally depends on the acted-upon variables); Beyond the sub-optimality that arises from
assuming/reducing to an independent world in (i), and disregarding the feasibility of non-altering
actions in (ii), non-altering actions may naturally incur a penalty which is not captured in the current
definition of cost. Hence, Assumption 2 does not hold either. Therefore, except in trivial cases where
the model designer actively inputs pair-wise independent features to hθ, generating recommendations
from counterfactual explanations in this manner, i.e., ignoring the dependencies between features,
warrants reconsideration. Next, we formalize these shortcomings using causal reasoning.
3.1 Actions as Interventions
LetM∈ Π denote the structural causal model (SCM) capturing all inter-variable causal dependencies
in the real world.M = 〈F,X,U〉 is characterized by the endogenous (observed) variables, X ∈ X ,
the exogenous variables, U ∈ U , and a sequence of structural equations F : U → X , describing
how endogenous variables can be (deterministically) obtained from the exogenous variables [31, 42].
Often,M is illustrated using a directed graphical model, G (see, e.g., Figure 1).
From a causal perspective, actions may be carried out via structural interventions, A : Π→ Π,
which can be thought of as a transformation between SCMs [30, 31]. A set of interventions can be
constructed as A = do({Xi := ai}i∈I) where I contains the indices of the subset of endogenous
variables to be intervened upon. In this case, for each i ∈ I , the do-operator replaces the structural
equation for the i-th endogenous variable Xi in F with Xi := ai. Correspondingly, graph surgery
is performed on G, severing graph edges incident on an intervened variable, Xi. Thus, performing
the actions A in a worldM yields the post-intervention world modelMA with structural equations
FA = {Fi} i 6∈I ∪ {Xi := ai}i∈I . Structural interventions are illustrated in Figure 2.
Structural interventions are used to predict the effect of actions on the world as a whole (i.e., howM
becomesMA). In the context of recourse, we aim to model the effect of actions on one individual’s
situation (i.e., how xF becomes xSCF) to ascertain whether or not the desirable outcome is achieved
(i.e., hθ(xF) 6= hθ(xSCF)). We compute individual-level effects using structural counterfactuals [33].
Assuming causal sufficiency ofM (i.e., no hidden confounders), and full specification of an invertible
F (such that F(F−1(x)) = x), X can be uniquely determined given the value of U (and vice-versa).
Hence, one can determine the distinct values of exogenous variables that give rise to a particular
realization of the endogenous variables, {Xi = xFi}i ⊆ X , as F−1(xF) [33].3 As a result, we can
compute any structural counterfactual query xSCF for an individual xF as xSCF = FA(F−1(xF)). In
our context, that is: “if an individual xF observed in worldM performs the set of actions A, what
will be the resulting individual’s feature vector xSCF”.4
3.2 Limitations of the CFE-based recourse approach
Next, we use causal reasoning to formalize the limitations of the CFE-based recourse approach in (2).
To this end, we first reinterpret the actions resulting from solving the CFE-based recourse problem,
δ∗, as structural interventions by defining the set of indices of observed variables that are intervened
upon, I . We remark that, given δ∗, an individual seeking recourse may intervene on any arbitrary
subset of observed variables I , as long as the intervention contains the variable indices for which
δ∗i 6= 0. Now, we are in a position to define CFE-based actions as interventions, i.e.,
Definition 3.1 (CFE-based actions). Given an individual xF observed in world M, the solution
of (2), δ∗, and the set of indices of observed variables that are acted upon, I , a CFE-based action
refers to a set of structural interventions of the form ACFE := do({Xi := xFi + δ∗i }i∈I).
3For simplicity, we interchangeably use sets and vectors, e.g., {Xi = xFi}i ⊆ X and xF ∈ X .
4Queries such as this subsume both retrospective/subjunctive/counterfactual (“what would have been the
value of”) and prospective/indicative/predictive (“what will be the value of”) conditionals [11, 22, 44], as long
as we assume that the laws governing the world, F, are stationary.
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X1 X2U1 U2
X1 := U1; X2 := f2(X1) + U2
} M
X1 X2 U2
X1 := a1; X2 := f2(X1) + U2
} M1
X1 X2U1
X1 := U1; X2 := a2
} M2
X1 X2
X1 := a1; X2 := a2
} M3
Figure 2: Given world model,M, intervening on X1 and/or on X2 result in different post-intervention
models:M1 =MA={do(X1:=a1)} corresponds to interventions only on X1 with consequential effects
on X2;M2 =MA={do(X2:=a2)} shows the result of structural interventions only on X2 which in
turn dismisses ancestral effects on this variable; and,M3 =MA={do(X1:=a1,X2:=a2)} is the resulting
(independent world) model after intervening on both variables, i.e., the type of interventions generally
assumed in the CFE-based recourse problem.
Using Definition 3.1, we can derive the following key results that provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for CFE-based actions to guarantee recourse.
Proposition 3.1. A CFE-based action, ACFE, where I = {i | δ∗i 6= 0}, in general results
in the structural counterfactual, xSCF = xCFE∗ := xF + δ∗, and thus guarantees recourse (i.e.,
h(xSCF) 6= h(xF)), if and only if, the set of descendants of the acted upon variables, determined by I ,
is the empty set.
Corollary 3.1. If the true worldM is independent, i.e, all the observed features are root-nodes, then
CFE-based actions always guarantee recourse.
While the above results are formally proven in Appendix A, we provide a sketch of the proof below. If
the intervened-upon variables do not have descendants, then by definition xSCF = xCFE∗. Otherwise,
the value of the descendants will depend on the counterfactual value of their parents, leading to a
structural counterfactual that does not resemble the nearest counterfactual explanation, xSCF 6= xCFE∗,
and thus may not result in recourse. Moreover, in an independent world the set of descendants of all
the variables is by definition the empty set.
Unfortunately, the independent world assumption is not realistic, as it requires all the features selected
to train the predictive model hθ to be independent of each other. Thus, for a given non-independent
M capturing the true causal dependencies between features, CFE-based actions require the individual
seeking recourse to enforce (at least partially) an independent post-intervention modelMACFE (so
that Assumption 1 holds), by intervening on all the observed variables for which δi 6= 0 as well
as on their descendants (even if their δi = 0). However, such requirement suffers from two main
issues. First, it conflicts with Assumption 2, since holding the value of variables may still imply
potentially infeasible interventions inM to sever all the incoming edges to such variables. Second,
as shown in Example 1 in Section 1 (and proven in the next section), CFE-based actions may still be
suboptimal, as they do not benefit from the causal effect of actions towards changing the prediction.
Thus, even when equipped with knowledge of causal dependencies, recommending actions directly
from counterfactual explanations in the manner of existing approaches is not satisfactory.
4 Algorithmic Recourse through Minimal Interventions
In the previous section, we learned that actions which immediately follow from counterfactual
explanations may require unrealistic assumptions, or alternatively, result in sub-optimal or even
infeasible recommendations. To solve such limitations we next reformulate the recourse problem
to seek the minimal cost set of actions (in the form of structural interventions) that results in a
counterfactual instance yielding the favourable output from hθ. Specifically, we re-formulate (2) as:
A∗ ∈ argmin
A
cost(A;xF)
s.t. hθ(x
SCF) 6= hθ(xF)
xSCF = FA(F
−1(xF))
xSCF ∈ P, A ∈ F ,
(3)
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where A∗ ∈ F directly specifies the set of feasible actions to be performed to achieve recourse at
minimal cost, with cost(·;xF) : F × X → R+, and xSCF∗ = FA∗(F−1(xF)) denotes the resulting
structural counterfactual. We recall that, while xSCF∗ is a counterfactual instance, it does not need to
correspond to the nearest counterfactual explanation, xCFE∗, resulting from (2) (see, e.g., Example 1
of Section 1). Importantly, using the formulation in (3) it is now straightforward to show the
suboptimality of CFE-based actions, as shown in the next result.
Proposition 4.1. Given an individual xF observed in worldM∈ Π, a family of feasible actions F ,
and the solution of (3), A∗ ∈ F . Assume that there exists CFE-based action ACFE ∈ F that achieves
recourse, i.e., hθ(xF) 6= hθ(xCFE∗). Then, cost(A∗;xF) ≤ cost(ACFE;xF).
Thus, for a known causal model capturing the dependencies among observed variables, and a family of
feasible interventions, the optimization problem in (3) yields Recourse through Minimal Interventions.
Further developing this formulation requires that we are able to compute the structural counterfactual,
xSCF, of the individual xF in worldM, given any feasible action, A. To this end, we consider that the
SCMM falls in the class of additive noise models (ANM),5 so that we can deterministically compute
the counterfactual xSCF = FA(F−1(xF)) by simply performing the Abduction-Action-Prediction
steps proposed by Pearl et al. [33]. Appendix B provides a detailed example on how to perform these
three steps, which are summarized by the following closed-form assignment equation:
xSCFi = [i ∈ I] · (xFi + δi) + [i /∈ I] ·
(
xFi + fi(pa
SCF
i )− fi(paFi )
)
. (4)
In words, the counterfactual value of the i-th feature, xSCFi , takes the value x
F
i + δi if such feature is
intervened upon (i.e., i ∈ I). Otherwise, xSCFi is computed as a function of both the factual and counter-
factual values of its parents, denoted respectively by fi(paFi ) and fi(pa
SCF
i ). Importantly, the closed-
form relations in (4) can simply replace the second constraint in (3), i.e., xSCF = FA(F−1(xF)).
Additionally, while our discussion has thus far focused on structural (a.k.a. hard) interventions [31],
where graph edges incident on the intervened upon variable are severed, an analogous closed-form
assignment can be written for additive (a.k.a. soft) interventions [10] in which ancestral changes
continue to propagate to the intervened variable, as:
xSCFi = [i ∈ I] · δi +
(
xFi + fi(pa
SCF
i )− fi(paFi )
)
. (5)
Importantly, (3) also enables a new class of feasibility constraints, F . Whereas prior work distin-
guished only between actionable (or mutable) and non-actionable (or immutable) variables [45], the
incorporation of causal structure allows for a finer separation of these terms. Specifically, we can
distinguish between i) immutable (e.g., sex); ii) actionable (e.g., bank balance); and iii) mutable
but non-actionable (e.g., credit-score) variables. Intuitively, the latter variable type is not directly
actionable by the individual, but may change as a consequence of a change to its causal ancestors
(e.g., regular debt payment).6 We invite the interested reader to review Appendix C, which provides
further real-world examples on selecting the form, feasibility, and scope of interventions.
Having specified the context- and user-dependent intervention form and feasibility constraints [3],
the optimization problem in (4) may be solved by building on existing frameworks for generating
nearest counterfactual explanations, including gradient-based, evolutionary-based, heuristics-based,
or verification-based approaches as referenced in Section 2. While out of scope of the current work,
for the illustrative examples below, we extended the open-source code of MACE [16]; we will submit
a pull-request to the respective repository.
4.1 Demonstration
We showcase our proposed formulation by comparing the actions recommended by existing (nearest)
counterfactual explanation methods, as in (2), to the ones generated by the proposed minimal
intervention formulation in (3). We recall that prior literature has focused on generating counterfactual
explanations or CFE-based actions, which as shown above lack optimally or feasibility guarantees in
5We remark that the presented formulation also holds for more general SCMs (for example where the
exogenous variable contribution is not additive) as long as the sequence of structural equations F is invertible,
i.e., there exists a sequence of equations F−1 such that x = F(F−1(x)) (in other words, the exogenous
variables are uniquely identifiable via the abduction step).
6Of course, this example assumes that a bank would not recommend fraudulent actions that may allow direct
intervention on credit-score.
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X1X2
X4
Yˆ
U1
U2
U3
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X1 := U1
X2 := U2
X3 := f3(X1,X2) + U3
X4 := f4(X3) + U4
 M
Yˆ = hθ
({Xi}4i=1)
Figure 3: Working example; see Section 4.1 and Appendix B for details.
non-independent worlds. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, there exists no baseline approach in the
literature that guarantees algorithmic recourse. The experiments below serve as an illustration of the
sub-optimality of existing approaches relative to our proposed formulation of recourse via minimal
intervention. Section 5 presents a detailed discussion on practical considerations.
We consider two settings: i) Example 1 in Section 1, whereM follows Figure 1; and ii) a real-world
setting based on the german credit dataset [1], whereM follows Figure 3. We computed the cost of
actions as the `1 norm over normalized feature changes to make effort comparable across features,
i.e., cost(·;xF) = ∑i∈I |δi|/Ri, where Ri is the range of feature i.
For the synthetic setting, we generate data following the model in Figure 1, where we assume
X1 := U1, X2 := 3/10 ·X1 + U2, with U1 ∼ $10000 ·Poission(10) and U2 ∼ $2500 ·N (0, 1); and
the predictive model hθ = sgn(X1 + 5 · X2 − $225000). Given xF = [$75000, $25000]T , solving
our formulation, (3), identifies the optimal action set A∗ = do(X1 := xF1 + $10000) which results in
xSCF∗ = FA∗(F−1(xF)) = [$85000, $28000]T , whereas solving previous formulations, (2), yields
δ∗ = [$0,+$5000]T resulting in xCFE∗ = xF + δ∗ = [$75000, $30000]T . Importantly, while xSCF∗
appears to be at a further distance from xF compared to xCFE∗, achieving the former is less costly
than the latter, specifically, cost(δ∗;xF) ≈ 2 cost(A∗;xF).
As a real-world setting, we consider a subset of the features in the german credit dataset. The
setup is depicted in Figure 3, where X1 is the individual’s gender (treated as immutable), X2 is the
individual’s age (actionable but can only increase), X3 is credit given by the bank (actionable), X4 is
the repayment duration of the credit (non-actionable but mutable), and Yˆ is the predicted customer
risk, according to hθ (logisitic regression or decision tree). We learn the structural equations by fitting
a linear regression model to the child-parent tuples. We will release the data, and the code used to
learn models and structural equations.
Given the setup above, for instance, for the individual xF = [Male, 32, $1938, 24]T identified as a
risky customer, solving our formulation, (3), yields the optimal action set A∗ = do({X2 := xF2 +
1,X3 := x
F
3 − $800}) which results in xSCF∗ = FA∗(F−1(xF)) = [Male, 33, $1138, 22]T , whereas
solving (2) yields δ∗ = [N/A,+6, 0, 0]T resulting in xCFE∗ = xF + δ∗ = [Male, 38, $1938, 24]T .
Similar to the toy setting, we observe a %42 decrease in effort required of the individual when
using the action by our method, since our cost function states that waiting for six years to get the
credit approved is more costly than applying the following year for a lower (−$800) credit amount.
More generally, in a population of 50 negatively affected test individuals, previous approaches
suggest actions that are on average %39±%24 and %65±%8 more costly than our approach when
considering, respectively, a logistic regression and a decision tree as the predictive model hθ.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have focused on the problem of algorithmic recourse, i.e., the process by which an
individual can change their situation to obtain a desired outcome from a machine learning model.
First, using the tools from causal reasoning (i.e., structural interventions and counterfactuals), we
have shown that in their current form, counterfactual explanations only bring about agency for the
individual to achieve recourse in unrealistic settings. In other words, counterfactual explanations do
not translate to an optimal or feasible set of actions that would favourably change the prediction of
hθ if acted upon. This shortcoming is primarily due to the lack of consideration of causal relations
governing the world and thus, the failure to model the downstream effect of actions in the predictions
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of the machine learning model. In other words, although “counterfactual” is a term from causal
language, we observed that existing approaches fall short in terms of taking causal reasoning into
account when generating counterfactual explanations and the subsequent recourse actions. Thus,
building on the statement by Wachter et al. [48] that counterfactual explanations “do not rely on
knowledge of the causal structure of the world,” it is perhaps more appropriate to refer to existing
approaches as contrastive, rather than counterfactual, explanations [6, 27].
To directly take causal consequences of actions into account, we have proposed a fundamental
reformulation of the recourse problem, where actions are performed as interventions and we seek to
minimize the cost of performing actions in a world governed by a set of (physical) laws captured in
a structural causal model. Our proposed formulation in (3), complemented with several examples
and a detailed discussion, allows for recourse through minimal interventions, that when performed
will result in a structural counterfactual that favourably changes the output of the model. Next, we
discuss the work most closely related to ours, the main limitation of the proposed recourse approach,
and propose future venues for research to address such shortcomings.
Related work. Up to our knowledge, only two recent works have considered the need of causal
constraints in the formulation of nearest counterfactuals. In the first piece of work, Joshi et al.
[15] study recourse in causal models under confounders. Here, counterfactual distributions are first
estimated under a fixed intervention and then recourse is solved similar to (2) with the plausibility
term constraining counterfactual instance to the approximated counterfactual distribution. In the
second work, Mahajan et al. [25] introduce an additional term constraint requiring that counterfactual
values of variables be similar to the value they would take under additive interventions to their
ancestors. While we instead consider structural interventions, this idea is conceptually similar to ours.
However, as pointed out in Section 3 and in contrast to our formulation in (3), this piece of work
does not state how to derive recourse actions from explanation. More importantly, neither approach
directly optimizes for the interventions that would lead to recourse, and thus, suffer from the same
limitations as other CFE-based recourse approaches.
Practical limitations. The primary limitation of our formulation in (3) is its reliance on the true
causal model of the world, subsuming both the graph, and the structural equations. In practice, the
underlying causal model is rarely known. While this is a valid concern of any approach suggesting
actions to be performed in the real world, we argue that existing approaches already implicitly make
causal assumptions (i.e., that of independence, or feasible and cost-free interventions). Therefore, at
worst case we replace an imperfect assumption about the data generative process with another.
Importantly, beyond explanations, the community on algorithmic fairness has echoed the need for
causal counterfactual analysis for fair predictions, and have also voiced their concern about untestable
assumptions when the true SCM is not available [2, 5, 17, 21, 40]. Thus, we consider further
discussion on causal discovery to be out of scope of this paper, as it remains as an open and key
question in the Ethical ML community.
Moreover, we emphasize that inferring interventional effects in causal models depends on modelling
assumptions and which variables are deemed endogenous vs exogenous. Our formulation optimizes
for interventions on endogenous variables that are directly actionable by the individual seeking
recourse or an assigned fiduciary [46]. This assumption, can be extended to consider changes to
exogenous variables via actions of a collective of individuals in a social context [27]. An example of
this may be the active protests in the U.S. We consider that the social context and collective actions
leads to the data that our algorithms are trained on for which we seek algorithmic recourse. The
examples presented in relation to the form and feasibility of intervention serve only to illustrate the
point that our formulation can technically handle a variety of real-world conditions/constraints. They
do not, however, aim to provide an authoritative definition of how to interpret various variables and
the context- and individual-dependent constraints for recourse as highlighted by other works [3, 19].
Future work. In future work, we will focus on overcoming the main assumption of our formulation:
the availability of the true world model,M. An immediate first step involves learning the true world
model (partially or fully) [9, 12, 26], and studying potential inefficiencies that may arise from partial
or imperfect knowledge of the causal model governing the world. Furthermore, while additive noise
models are a broadly used class of SCMs for modeling real-world systems, further investigation into
the effects of confounders (non-independent noise variables), the presence of only the causal graph,
as well as cyclic graphical models for time series data (e.g., conditional interventions), would extend
the reach of algorithmic recourse to even broader settings.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proposition 3.1. A CFE-based action, ACFE, where I = {i | δ∗i 6= 0}, in general results
in the structural counterfactual, xSCF = xCFE∗ := xF + δ∗, and thus guarantees recourse (i.e.,
h(xSCF) 6= h(xF)), if and only if, the set of descendants of the acted upon variables, determined by I ,
is the empty set.
Proof. The setting assumes that the causal graph G is available such that the parent set for each
variable is known. Let d(X) and nd(X) denote the sets of descendants and non-descendants of the
variable X according to G, respectively. For multiple intervened-upon variables, we define:
XI := {Xi}i∈I ,
nd(XI) := ∩i∈Ind(Xi),
d(XI) := X \ (XI ∪ nd(XI)).
Note that, by definition, XI , nd(XI), and d(XI) form a partition of the set of all variables X.
To prove the iff conditional, we prove each direction separately. For ease of exposition, we define
xSCF = xCFE∗ := xF + δ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
⇐⇒ d(XI) = ∅︸ ︷︷ ︸
q
where we recall the remark that given δ∗, an individual seeking recourse may intervene on any
arbitrary subset of observed variables XI , as long as (δ∗i 6= 0) =⇒ (i ∈ I).
q =⇒ p: Borrowing the closed-form expression of a structural counterfactual from (4), we have
xSCFi =
{
xFi + δ
∗
i i ∈ I
xFi + fi(pa
SCF
i )− fi(paFi ) i 6∈ I
(A.1)
which can be broken down further to specify the descendants and non-descendants of intervened
upon variables, as
xSCFi =

xFi + δ
∗
i i ∈ I
xFi + fi(pa
SCF
i )− fi(paFi ) i ∈ d(XI)
xFi + fi(pa
SCF
i )− fi(paFi ) i ∈ nd(XI)
(A.2)
By assumption, d(XI) = ∅, so the second case never holds.
Furthermore, since structural interventions leave non-descendant variables unaffected, we have that
paSCFi = pa
F
i ∀i ∈ nd(XI).
Consequently,
fi(pa
SCF
i )− fi(paFi ) = fi(paFi )− fi(paFi ) = 0 ∀i ∈ nd(XI).
In summary, we have
xSCFi =
{
xFi + δ
∗
i i ∈ I
xFi i ∈ nd(XI)
(A.3)
which, upon realising that (δ∗i 6= 0) =⇒ (i ∈ I), reduces to xSCF = xCFE∗ := xF + δ∗ as desired.
¬q =⇒ ¬p: Starting with the negation of q, we have the ∃ k ∈ I s.t. d(Xk) 6= ∅. It is assumed
that δ∗k 6= 0 (i.e., we are not performing a non-altering intervention on Xk), then using the same
expression for structural counterfactuals in (A.2), there in general exists a descendant ofXk for which
the value of its ancestors change under intervention, i.e., ∃ l ∈ d(XI) s.t. fl(paSCFl )− fl(paFl ) 6= 0.
Thus, xSCFl 6= xFl and thus xSCF 6= xCFE∗ := xF + δ∗. Our proof ignores special cases such as
piece-wise constant structural equations, where for some δ∗i 6= 0, the descendant of Xi remains
invariant. These rare cases can be thought of as locally violating causal minimality [34, Sec. 6.5] and
are thus disregarded.
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A.2 Proof of Corollary 3.1
Corollary 3.1. If the true worldM is independent, i.e, all the observed features are root-nodes, then
CFE-based actions always guarantee recourse.
Proof. If the true worldM is independent, then by definition the set of descendants for all variables
is the empty set. Thus, the statement follows directly from Proposition 3.1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proposition 4.1. Given an individual xF observed in worldM∈ Π, a family of feasible actions F ,
and the solution of (3), A∗ ∈ F . Assume that there exists CFE-based action ACFE ∈ F that achieves
recourse, i.e., hθ(xF) 6= hθ(xCFE∗). Then, cost(A∗;xF) ≤ cost(ACFE;xF).
Proof. Having assumed that both ACFE,A∗ ∈ F , and considering that A∗ is the optimal solution
of (3) constrained to F , it follows from definition of optimality that cost(A∗;xF) ≤ cost(ACFE;xF).
B Working example
Consider the model in Figure 3, and assume that the SCM falls in the class of additive noise models
(ANM), where {Ui}4i=1 are mutually independent exogenous variables, and {fi}4i=1 are structural
(linear or nonlinear) equations.
Let xF = [xF1, x
F
2, x
F
3, x
F
4]
T be the observed features belonging to an (factual) individual, for whom
we seek a counterfactual explanation and recommendation. Also, let I denote the set of indices
corresponding to the subset of endogenous variables that are intervened upon according to the
action set A. Then, we obtain a structural counterfactual, xSCF = FA(F−1(xF)), by applying the
Abduction-Action-Prediction method of counterfactual reasoning [32] as:
Step 1. Abduction uniquely determines the value of all exogenous variables given evidence, {Xi =
xFi}4i=1:
u1 = x
F
1,
u2 = x
F
2,
u3 = x
F
3 − f3(xF1, xF2),
u4 = x
F
4 − f4(xF3).
(B.1)
Step 2. Action modifies the SCM according to the hypothetical interventions, do({Xi := ai}i∈I),
yielding FA as (where ai may be xFi + δi):
X1 := [1 ∈ I] · a1 + [1 /∈ I] ·U1,
X2 := [2 ∈ I] · a2 + [2 /∈ I] ·U2,
X3 := [3 ∈ I] · a3 + [3 /∈ I] ·
(
f3(X1,X2) + U3
)
,
X4 := [4 ∈ I] · a4 + [4 /∈ I] ·
(
f4(X3) + U4
)
,
(B.2)
where [·] denotes the Iverson bracket.
Step 3. Prediction recursively determines the values of all endogenous variables based on the
computed exogenous variables {ui}4i=1 from Step 1 and FA from Step 2, as:
xSCF1 := [1 ∈ I] · a1 + [1 /∈ I] ·
(
u1
)
,
xSCF2 := [2 ∈ I] · a2 + [2 /∈ I] ·
(
u2
)
,
xSCF3 := [3 ∈ I] · a3 + [3 /∈ I] ·
(
f3(x
SCF
1 , x
SCF
2 ) + u3
)
,
xSCF4 := [4 ∈ I] · a4 + [4 /∈ I] ·
(
f4(x
SCF
3 ) + u4
)
.
(B.3)
Putting it all together, we obtain the closed form expression in (4).
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C Towards Realistic Interventions
In Section 4, we formulated algorithmic recourse by considering the causal relations between features
in the real world. Our formulation minimized the cost of actions, which were carried out as structural
interventions on the corresponding graph. Each intervention proceeds by unconditionally severing all
edges incident on the intervened node, fixing the post-manipulation distribution of a single variable
to one deterministic value. While intuitive appealing and powerful, structural interventions are in
many ways the simplest type of interventions, and their “simplicity comes at a price: foregoing the
possibility of modeling many situations realisitically” [8, 20]. Below, we extend (3) and (4) to add
flexibility and realism to the types of interventions performed by the individual. Notably, there is
nothing inherent to an SCM that a priori determines the form, feasibility, or scope of intervention;
instead, these choices are delegated to the individual and are made based on a semantic understanding
of the modeled variables.
C.1 On the Form of Interventions
The demonstrations in Section 4.1 primarily focused on actions performed as structural (a.k.a.,
hard) interventions where all incoming edges to the intervened node are severed (see (4)). Hard
interventions are particularly useful for Randomized Control Trial (RCT) settings where one aims
to evaluate (isolate) the causal effect of an action (e.g., effect of aspirin on patients with migraine)
on the population by randomly assigning instances (e.g., individuals) to treatment/control groups,
removing the influence of other factors (e.g., age).
In the context of algorithmic recourse, however, an individual performs actions in the real world,
and therefore must play the rules governing the world. In earlier sections, these rules (captured
in an SCM) guided the search for an optimal set of actions by modelling actions along with their
consequences. The rules, however, also determine the form of an intervention, e.g., specifying
whether an intervention cancels out or complements existing causal effect relations.
For instance, consider Example #1 in Section 1, where an individual chooses to increase their bank
balance (e.g., through borrowing money from family, i.e., a deliberate action/intervention on X2 while
continuing to put aside a portion of their income (i.e., retaining the relation X2 := 3/10 ·X1 + U2).
Indeed, it would be unwise for a recommendation to suggest abandoning saving habits. In such a
scenario, the action would be carried out as additive (a.k.a., soft) intervention [10]. Such interventions
do not sever graphical edges incident on the intervened node and continue to allow for parents of the
node to affect that node.
The previous example illustrates a scenario where an individual actually has the agency to perform a
structural intervention, but prefers an additive intervention instead. However, it is easy to conceive
of examples where such an option does not exist. For instance, as part of a medical system’s
recommendation, we might consider adding 5 mg/l of insulin to a patient with diabetes with a certain
blood insulin level [33]. This action cannot disable pre-existing mechanisms regulating blood insulin
levels and therefore, the action can only be performed additively.
Additive interventions are easily handled in our framework, where the general assignment formulation
(4) is updated for variables that can be intervened upon in an additive manner:
xSCFi = [i ∈ I] · δi +
(
xFi + fi(pa
SCF
i )− fi(paFi )
)
. (C.1)
The choice of whether interventions should be applied in a additive/soft or structural/hard manner
will depend on the variable semantic, and should be decided prior to solving (3), as discussed in [3].
C.2 On the Feasibility of Interventions
We saw in Section 3 that earlier works motivated the addition of feasibility constraints as a means
to provide more actionable recommendations for the individual seeking recourse [45]. There, the
actionability (a.k.a. mutability) of a feature was determined based on the feature semantic and value
in the factual instance, marking those features which the individual has/lacks the agency to change
(e.g., bank balance vs. race). While the interchangeable use of definition holds under an independent
world, it fails when operating in most real-world settings governed by a set of causal dependencies.
We study this subtlety below.
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In an independent world, any change to variable Xi could come about only via an intervention on Xi
itself. Therefore, immutable and non-actionable variables overlap. In a dependent world, however,
changes to variable Xi may arise from an intervention on Xi or through changes to any of the ancestors
of Xi. In this more general setting, we can tease apart the definition of actionability and mutability,
and distinguish between three types of variables: (i) immutable (and hence non-actionable), e.g.,
race; (ii) mutable but non-actionable, e.g., credit score; and (iii) actionable (and hence mutable), e.g.,
bank balance. Each type requires special consideration which we show can be intuitively encoded as
constraints amended to A ∈ F from (3).
Immutable: We posit that the set of immutable (and hence non-actionable) variables should be
closed under ancestral relationships given by the model,M. This condition parallels the ancestral
closure of protected attributions in [21]. This would ensure that under no circumstance would an
intervention on an ancestor of an immutable variable change the immutable variable. Therefore,
for an immutable variable Xi, the constraint [i /∈ I] = 1 recursively necessitates the fulfillment of
additional constraints [j /∈ I] = 1 ∀ j ∈ pai in F . For instance, the immutability of race triggers the
immutability of birthplace.
Mutable but non-actionable: To encode the conditions for mutable but non-actionable variables, we
note that while a variable may not be directly actionable, it may still change as a result of changes to
its parents. For example, the financial credit score in Figure 3 may change as a result of interventions
to salary or savings, but is not itself directly intervenable. Therefore, for a non-actionable but mutable
variable Xi, the constraint [i /∈ I] = 1 is sufficient and does not induce any other constraints.
Actionable: In the most general sense, the actionable feasibility of an intervention on Xi may be
contingent on a number of conditions, as follows: (a) the pre-intervention value of the intervened
variable (i.e., xFi ); (b) the pre-intervention value of other variables (i.e., {xFj}j⊂[d]\i); (c) the post-
intervention value of the intervened variable (i.e., xSCFi ); and (d) the post-intervention value of other
variables (i.e., {xSCFj }j⊂[d]\i). Such feasibility conditions can easily be encoded into F ; consider the
following scenarios:
(a) an individual’s age can only increase, i.e., [xSCFage ≥ xFage];
(b) an individual cannot apply for credit on a temporary visa, i.e.,
[xFvisa = PERMANENT] ≥ [xSCFcredit = TRUE];
(c) an individual may undergo heart surgery (an additive intervention) only if they won’t remiss due
to sustained smoking habits, i.e., [xSCFheart 6= REMISSION]; and
(d) an individual may undergo heart surgery only after their blood pressure is regularized due to
medicinal intervention, i.e., [xSCFbp = O.K.] ≥ [xSCFheart = SURGERY].
In summary, while previous works on algorithmic recourse distinguished between actionable, condi-
tionally actionable,7 and immutable variables [45], we can now operate on a more realistic spectrum
of variables, ranging from conditionally soft/hard actionable, to non-actionable but mutable, and
finally to immutable and non-actionable variables.
C.3 On the Scope of Interventions
One final assumption has been made throughout our discussion of actions as interventions is the
one-to-one mapping between an action in the real world and an intervention on a endogenous variable
in the structural causal model, which in turn are also input features to the predictive model.
As exemplified in [3], it is possible for some actions (e.g., finding a higher-paying job) to simultane-
ously intervene multiple variables in the model (e.g., income and length of employment). Alternatively,
for Example #2 in Section 1, choosing a new paddy location is equivalent to intervening jointly on
several input features of the predictive model. Such confounded/correlated interventions, referred to
as fat-hand/non-atomic interventions [10], will be explored further in follow-up work, by modelling
the world at different causally consistent levels [4, 36].
7Ustun et al. [45] also support conditionally actionable features (e.g., age or educational degree) with
conditions derived only from xFi as in (a). We generalize the set of conditions to support actions conditioned on
the value of other variables as in (b), additive interventions in (c), and sequential interventions as in (d).
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